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Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
 
F. Aaron Rains 
 
In Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, the Hoopa Valley Tribe 
challenged the intentional and continual delay of state water quality 
certification review of water discharged from a series of dams on the 
Klamath River in California and Oregon. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the states of Oregon and California, and PacifiCorp, a 
hydroelectric operator, were implementing an administrative scheme 
designed to circumvent a one-year temporal requirement for review 
imposed on states by the Clean Water Act. This scheme allowed 
PacifiCorp to operate the series of dams for over a decade without proper 
state water quality certification. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held in favor of the Hoopa Valley Tribe 
and vacated FERC’s ruling while also holding that Oregon and California 
had waived their Section 401 water quality certification authority.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Hoopa Valley Tribe (“Hoopa Tribe” or “Hoopa”) petitioned 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
(“the court”) to review orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) that found California and Oregon (“States”) had 
not waived their Clean Water Act (“CWA”) Section 401 water quality 
certification authority (“Section 401 authority”) and that PacifiCorp had 
properly executed their dam operation relicensing application.1 The Hoopa 
Tribe presented three arguments: 1) the States had waived their Section 
401 authority by exceeding the one-year statutorily mandated review 
period; 2) PacifiCorp had not diligently applied for relicensing; and 3) 
FERC failed in performing its regulatory duty.2 Holding that the States had 
waived their Section 401 authority pursuant to the explicit language of 
Section 401 itself, the court vacated and remanded FERC’s ruling and 
ordered FERC to “proceed with its review of, and licensing determination 
for, the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.”3   
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case dealt with the licensing and potential decommissioning 
of a series of dams along the Klamath River in Oregon and California.4 
The original license to operate the dams was issued in 1954 and expired in 
2006, and PacifiCorp––the current dam operator––subsequently 
maintained operation on an annual, interim licensing scheme.5 Several of 
                                                     
 1. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
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the dams on the lower reaches of the Klamath are outdated and do not 
comply with current environmental standards, thereby preventing CWA 
compliance and inhibiting long-term operational licensure.6 To remedy 
this issue, PacifiCorp determined to decommission those non-compliant 
dams while keeping the compliant, upper-river dams in operation.7 
PacifiCorp submitted a relicensing application and proposal to FERC and 
met all of the relicensing requirements, except the state water quality 
requirement per Section 401 of the CWA.8  
In 2008, the States, Tribal representatives, farmers, ranchers, 
conservation groups, fishermen, and PacifiCorp entered into negotiations 
regarding the dam decommissioning process for the lower dams.9 In 2010, 
the negotiations resulted in the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement 
Agreement (“KHSA"), which included “a series of interim environmental 
measures and funding obligations [imposed on PacifiCorp],” and set a 
potential 2020 decommission date for the non-compliant dams.10  
Under the KHSA, California, Oregon, and PacifiCorp agreed to 
circumvent a one-year statutory limit imposed on states by the CWA for 
review of an entity’s Section 401 compliance by allowing PacifiCorp to 
repeatedly withdraw and resubmit their 401 water quality requests to 
continually renew the state period of review.11 Additionally, the KHSA 
“explicitly required the abeyance of all state permitting reviews” while the 
withdrawal and resubmission was occurring.12 These tactics were designed 
to prevent the States from waiving their Section 401 certification authority, 
thus ensuring the vitality of the project.13   
 The KHSA also included various “preconditions for 
decommissioning,” including securing federal funding for the project, 
which ultimately never occurred.14 As a result, the parties amended the 
KHSA to split the licensing of the lower, non-compliant dams from the 
upper dams.15 The amended KHSA was designed to transfer 
decommissioning-related licensing and liability exposure to a separate 
entity: the Klamath River Renewal Corporation (“KRRC”).16  
 In late 2016, PacifiCorp applied to FERC for an amended license, 
which would create a new, separate license exclusively for the lower dams 
and facilitate transfer of lower-dam management to KRRC.17 After review, 
FERC issued a new license for the lower dams, effectively separating them 
from the upper dams, but it did not approve transfer of the new license to 
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KRRC.18 As a result, PacifiCorp still held both the upper and lower dam 
licenses.19 
 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 2012, the Hoopa Tribe, whose reservation lies along the lower 
reaches of the Klamath and were not party to the negotiations of the KSHA 
or amended KHSA, petitioned FERC to declare that “California and 
Oregon had waived their 401 certification authority and that PacifiCorp 
had correspondingly failed to diligently prosecute its licensing application 
for the Project.”20 In June 2014, FERC denied Hoopa’s petition, and 
Hoopa subsequently requested a rehearing which was also denied.21 In late 
2014, Hoopa petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia to 
review FERC’s orders.22 In light of the amended KHSA, the court held 
Hoopa’s petition in abeyance for several years pending the supposed 
forthcoming decommission of the lower dams.23 By May 2018, the 
decommissioning still had not occurred, and the court removed Hoopa’s 
case from abeyance and reviewed FERC’s orders.24  
III. ANALYSIS 
The court reviewed FERC’s order under the Administrative 
Procedures Act which “empowers the court to reverse any decision that is 
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.’”25 Notably, the court did not give FERC’s 
interpretation or conclusions regarding Section 401 of the CWA any 
agency deference as it was “not the agency charged with administering the 
CWA.” 26  
A. Sovereign Immunity 
As amicus curiae, the state of Oregon challenged the court’s 
jurisdiction by asserting that California and Oregon had exercised their 
sovereign immunity rights under the Eleventh Amendment by refusing to 
intervene in the review process.27 Additionally, Oregon asserted that it was 
an “indispensable party” because the review was, in part, an analysis of 
whether Oregon and California had waived their Section 401 authority.28 
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Under this rationale, Oregon moved to dismiss the case, basing its 
argument on Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.29 
The court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 does not control the issue in 
question and that Oregon and California were not indispensable parties to 
the case.30 Instead, the court determined that as an appellate review of an 
agency action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 “only requires the respondent federal 
agency” to be party to a petition for review.31  
Addressing Oregon’s sovereign immunity argument generally, the 
court stated, “Oregon's position is incompatible with the precepts of 
federalism and this Court's prior precedent.”32 Hoopa specifically 
challenged a federal agency’s orders regarding application of the CWA, a 
federal statute.33 Thus, the court held that as a federal court of appeal it 
had proper jurisdiction over the matter.34   
B. Waiver Under Section 401 
Hoopa sought relief under three theories: 1) the States had waived 
their Section 401 authority, 2) PacifiCorp failed to properly execute its 
relicensing application, and 3) FERC failed to perform its regulatory 
duty.35 The court narrowed these arguments into a single issue: whether 
the States waived their Section 401 authority by allowing PacifiCorp to 
repeatedly withdraw and submit their request for Section 401 water quality 
certification to avoid exceeding the one-year deadline.36 
The court held that the “temporal element” of Section 401 is 
explicit in stating: “[if the state] … fails or refuses to act on a request for 
certification, within a reasonable time (which shall not exceed one 
year).”37 Specifically, the court focused on the “act on a request” language, 
observing that FERC used this language to allow the States to treat each 
new request that PacifiCorp made individually, thus restarting the clock 
on the one-year statutory maximum and, in turn, allowing the States to 
retain their Section 401 authority.38 In doing so, the court found that FERC 
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by determining that the States had 
not ‘failed to act’ pursuant to Section 401.39 
Additionally, the court found that PacifiCorp never intended to 
submit an entirely new application for Section 401 certification to the 
States, and that the “withdrawal-and-resubmission” arrangement made 
under the KHSA was designed to “circumvent congressionally granted 
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authority over the licensing, conditioning and developing of a 
hydroelectric project.”40 Further, the court noted that it had repeatedly 
found that Congress intended Section 401 “to prevent a State from 
indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding”––however, it 
acknowledged that it had never addressed a case with the exact factual 
scenario presented here.41  
In a supplemental brief, FERC argued that the Second Circuit had 
suggested that “in light of various practical difficulties . . . a state could 
‘request that the applicant withdraw and resubmit the application.’”42 The 
court found that the Second Circuit’s dicta was not central to their holding 
in that case, and was made only to “rebut state agency fears” that the one-
year review period could result in error during the review process.43 The 
court noted that PacifiCorp’s Section 401 request to the States had been 
“complete and ready for review for more than a decade,” and such state 
agency fears were not applicable to current case.44 Therefore, the court 
found there was no legal basis for an exception to the one-year review 
period and held that California and Oregon had waived their Section 401 
statutory authority over the project.45 
 
C. Futility 
 
FERC argued that if the States had waived their Section 401 
authority, FERC would be required to deny PacifiCorp’s license, and in 
turn PacifiCorp would be required to file a decommissioning plan for all 
of the Klamath dams.46 The decommissioning of the dams would result in 
a “discharge into navigable waters” which would trigger Section 401 and 
require water quality certification from the States.47 Thus, the States not 
timely reviewing PacifiCorp’s request for water quality certification 
would necessitate the States perform a water quality review so that the 
dams could be decommissioned.48 FERC argued that this was a futile, 
circular sequence of events, and that it would result in delays not in the 
public interest.49 
The court acknowledged FERC’s concerns of further delay but 
held that they did not “trump express statutory directives.”50 Additionally, 
the court noted that, had FERC found that the States had waived their 
                                                     
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1104–05 (quoting Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643 
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v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 
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Section 401 authority when the one-year maximum had run over a decade 
ago, decommissioning would likely already be underway.51 Further, the 
court addressed FERC’s prominent, and asserted role in “protecting the 
public interest in hydropower projects” by participating in discussion 
regarding proposed settlements resulting from the development and 
decommission of hydroelectric projects.52 The court noted that FERC had 
neglected this role by underrepresenting the interests of Hoopa during the 
negotiation of both the KHSA and the amended KHSA, and in any related 
settlement agreements.53 Therefore, the court disagreed that finding a 
waiver of state authority would be futile, as it would ultimately allow 
Hoopa and FERC to become party to the negotiations and discussions 
regarding the Klamath River dams.54  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court’s holding in this case is a victory for the Hoopa Tribe 
and other traditionally underrepresented groups nationwide. Indigenous 
peoples have a place at the negotiating table when federal projects affect 
reservation land and specifically, that FERC’s role in protecting the public 
interest is an important part of the process. The court’s holding also 
reinforces the power of explicit, statutory language used in congressional 
acts, and highlights the necessity for clear and consistent language that 
directly expresses the intent of congress. Additionally, the court exposes a 
willingness of the state, federal, and private entities involved to exploit 
perceived loopholes in federal statues, namely the CWA. Finally, this 
holding highlights the effectiveness of the legal system by illustrating the 
process of administratively and legally challenging agency rulings and 
orders that are perceived to be unjust.   
                                                     
51. Id.   
52. Id. at 1105 (citing Settlements in Hydropower Licensing Proceedings 
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